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The aim of this study is to understand how the Russian pro-government youth movement 
Yunarmiya (Юнармия) promotes values that assist the Russian state through its presence online 
and use of social media accounts. This research responds to the questions of how Yunarmiya 
fosters both militaristic and nationalistic values and creates a specific, persuasive version of 
Russian nationalism by evaluating the image it wishes to convey to young people as a form of 
propaganda. Answers to these questions provide a glimpse into the government’s needs from its 
youngest generations, as a breakdown of the symbolism, propaganda, and rhetorical tactics it 
employs reveal that Yunarmiya is trying to create a climate where service to the Russian state is 
lauded and the country’s youth is indirectly made to feel as if it owes itself to service of the 
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INTRODUCTION: YUNARMIYA WHO? 
Involvement of young people in political groups has been popular in Russian society 
since the Soviet period and was reignited after Vladimir Putin was elected president in 2000. 
Since then, such organizations have taken shape depending on the government’s current social 
and political needs, but share a set of core principles and an allegiance either to the Russian 
president or government more broadly. These movements are often assembled to face threats to 
Moscow and there have been roughly four waves marketing themselves to different social groups 
of youth since Putin’s first term. While earlier groups such as Moving Together (Идущие 
Вместе) and Nashi (Наши/Ours) focused on the ability to rally young people as counter 
protestors to a possible Color Revolution (such as happened in Ukraine and other surrounding 
nations), artistic groups have also stepped forth to popularize events such as the annexation of 
Crimea in 2014. Cresting the most recent wave is the militant “patriotic” youth group Yunarmiya 
(Юнармия or the Young Army Cadets National Movement), which was founded in 2015 and 
promotes values associated with military service and the continuation of traditions honoring 
Russians who served in past conflicts.1
 
1“Всероссийское Военно-Патриотическое Общественное Движение «Юнармия».” Министерство обороны 
Российской Федерации (Минобороны России). http://stat.mil.ru/youtharmy/info.htm. 
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Yunarmiya draws its roots from a turbulent period for Russians. In 2014, the involvement 
of Russian forces in covert operations in eastern Ukraine led to the Russian annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula and a civil war in the Donbass region.2 Therefore, the Russian government 
managed to place itself in a much different position within the international community than it 
had previously occupied. Although Russian forces had conduced pre-Crimean military 
interventions, the annexation attracted criticism and a harsh response from the United States and 
Europe. Sanctions negatively impacted the Russian economy and affected the well-being of 
many average Russians, but provided Moscow with the opportunity to capitalize on its situation.3 
The Russian government could blame the West for undermining Russian success and attempt to 
turn its people against cooperation with foreign nations. “Traditional” Russian patriotism could 
be reconstructed and national identity could become more intertwined with the government. The 
aim of this study is to understand how Yunarmiya promotes values that assist the Russian 
government through its presence online and through social media accounts.  
With the rising popularity and accessibility of social media among young people, and the 
complex effects its presence has on mass organization, the manner in which politically active 
groups reach their audience and produce a desired image within online communities has 
fundamentally changed. In decades prior, membership in political youth groups in the Soviet 
Union was widely encouraged as a method of making connections for future employment and 
social standing. Now, decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, membership in groups 
supporting the government is usually voluntary. Therefore, it is imperative to effectively market 
 
2“The Ukrainian Crisis Timeline.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. http://ukraine.csis.org/. 
 
3Mike Eckel. "Poll: Majority of Russians Support Crimea Annexation, But Worry About Economic Effects." Radio 





to young people and present pro-government (or pro-Putin) values in an attractive way. 
Yunarmiya currently boasts 700,000 members across the Russian Federation, and although these 
numbers are difficult to verify, recruitment is a major concern.4 In order to communicate with 
younger generations that have become accustomed to online platforms, government-sponsored 
groups must compete for attention against all other organizations in formats which encourage 
quick scrolling and skimming. 
Because this is a study of online material, Yunarmiya’s true demographic breakdown and 
daily activities are difficult to determine. Images the group presents on its website and social 
media accounts depict both girls and boys taking part in a variety of activities. Although 
Yunarmiya claims to recruit children aged eight to eighteen, some look even younger.5 Social 
media posts discussed in later chapters mention programs and activities taking place in regions 
on the edges of the Russian Federation, and although it claims to have offices in eighty-five 
regions around the country (and provides contact information for each), there is not information 
on the number of members for which each office is responsible.6 Evidence has become available 
to suggest that the children of military officers are obligated to join, and backlash against 
Yunarmiya’s presence in schools reveals that the group has made inroads in educational 
institutions, but many more questions about the group’s structure and members remain 
unanswered.7 Because of these demographic difficulties, the main focus of this study will be 
 
4Юнармия. Last modified 2020. https://yunarmy.ru/. 
 
5"О Движении «Юнармия»." Юнармия. Last modified 2020. https://yunarmy.ru/headquarters/about/. 
 
6"Региональные штабы." Юнармия. Last modified 2020. https://yunarmy.ru/headquarters/branches/. 
 
7Thomas Nilsen. "Children of officers are ‘forced’ to join Youth Army, says leaked document." The Barents 
Observer. Last modified February 25, 2019. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/02/children-officers-
are-forced-join-youtharmy-says-leaked-document. 




evaluating the image Yunarmiya wishes to convey about itself to young people and their parents 
on the internet. 
Keeping this information in mind, the main questions I will address in this study are: 
How is the Russian youth group Yunarmiya promoting militaristic and nationalistic values 
through its website and social media presence? How does this group construct a specific version 
of Russian patriotism and how does it intend to persuade its audience that this understanding is 
the right one? What are the current and future implications of this group for youth in Russia?  
 Answers to these questions will provide a glimpse into the government’s needs from its 
youngest generations. An inclination toward government service stemming from direct 
participation in the group’s activities, or observation of peers, can leave a lasting impression on 
children and teens. Stress on military training implies a need for more recruits and begs inquiry 
about the motivation for such a need. This may be an attempt to address the growing problem of 
compulsory military service in Russia. Putin has been discussing the possibility of abolishing 
such service and professionalizing the Russian military since 2001, but this plan has never come 
to fruition.8 It could also be interpreted as a strategy to continue riding the surge of the Russian 
government’s popularity with its citizens after the annexation of Crimea or a continuation of 
resistance to growing Western influence in the Russian periphery.  
 In order to analyze Yunarmiya’s method of communication, this study will approach the 
group as a creator of propaganda. While propaganda is perhaps an infamous term, its use here is 
not meant to alarm, but instead to facilitate understanding. According to a compilation of studies 
in online and visual propaganda, it can be understood as a “two-way transaction in which elite 
 
8"Putin (Again) Announces End of Compulsory Military Service in Russia." Warsaw Institute. Last modified April 
19, 2019. https://warsawinstitute.org/putin-announces-end-compulsory-military-service-russia/. 
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propagandizing interacts with audiences who play an active role in the production of meaning.”9 
When applied in a strategic context, however, the United States Department of Defense defines 
propaganda instead as “any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or 
misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any 
group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.”10 There is different, 
traditional Soviet understanding of propaganda that further “links education and agitation with 
organization [and] mobilization.”11 The first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia reveals the 
tie between using propaganda to reeducate people with higher levels of education and agitating 
and appealing to the emotions of masses of people when quick action was needed.12 All of these 
interpretations are relevant to the study of Yunarmiya’s online activities. Overall, this research 
will address Yunarmiya’s political and social culture and will likely raise many more questions 
about the Russian government’s aims for this large group with remarkably young members. 
While there is plenty of literature on the role of youth in politics and how young people 
are perceived as political agents, it has become increasingly important to study the influence of 
political youth groups in contemporary Russia, which are affected by the historical perceptions 
of the role of youth within the region.13 Western scholarship often considers youth movements to 
be quintessentially counterculture, anti-government, or anti-conservative, but a wealth of 
 
9Cori Dauber and Carol Winkler, eds., Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment, (Carlisle: 
Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), 7. 
 
10Dauber and Winkler, Visual Propaganda, 7. 
 
11Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies. New York: Oxford 




13Lonnie R. Sherrod, ed., “Eastern Europe, Youth and Citizenship In,” Youth Activism: An International 




scholarship on subjects such as Nashi and Russian nationalism has emerged to examine the 
dynamics of different pro-government influences on youth. With the threat of Russian aggression 
hanging over many of its former Soviet satellite states, and in some cases the whole of Europe 
itself, the need to understand the political forces influencing young people in Russia is growing. 
The mindset of the youth in any country will affect that nation for decades to come.  
 Although Putin’s party, United Russia (Единая Россия), has enjoyed the majority of 
power in government since 2000, there is a range of political parties present in the Duma and 
regional governments which encourage youth participation. The People’s Freedom Party 
(Партия народной свободы, ПАРНАС/PARNAS), a group opposing the corruption and limited 
freedoms faced in the Russian government, has experienced problems with government 
recognition as a legitimate party.14 Due to periods of limited activity, its youth participation has 
taken various paths, at one point united behind the leadership of party official Mikhail Kasyanov, 
but the movement dropped off in 2012 while the party underwent transformations in membership 
and structure.15 The Russian United Democratic Party “Yabloko” (Яблоко), an independent 
political party, appears to be among the best organized opposition parties in regard to youth 
involvement in recent years with its Yabloko Youth. The Yabloko Youth formerly enjoyed a 
more centralized core to their organization, but recently the more active groups have been 
regional branches in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other large cities.16 
 
14"ВС РФ отменил решение о ликвидации Республиканской партии России." Российское агентство правовой 
и судебной информации. Last modified January 23, 2012. 
http://rapsinews.ru/judicial_news/20120123/259723488.html. 
 
15Данила Гальперович. "Касьянов ведет РНДС к ПАРНАСУ." Радио Свобода. Last modified May 19, 2012. 
https://www.svoboda.org/a/24586331.html. 
 
16"Молодёжное Яблоко." ВКонтакте. Last modified 2020. https://m.vk.com/youthyabloko.  
"Московское Молодежное Яблоко." ВКонтакте. Last modified 2020. https://m.vk.com/yabloko_moscow. 
"Молодёжное Яблоко | Санкт-Петербург." ВКонтакте. Last modified 2020. https://m.vk.com/spb_molyabloko. 
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The St. Petersburg Yabloko Youth branch allows young people ages 14 to 30 to apply for 
membership through a form on its VKontakte page (ВКонтакте/InContact, a Russian version of 
Facebook), and sees itself as the party with the most potential to counter the “mafia state” it says 
has taken control of the Russian government.17 The movement states on this webpage that it 
stands against “aggressive foreign policy,” military conscription, Bolshevism, Stalinism, media 
censorship, “nationalism and religious fundamentalism in any form,” and more.18 Members of 
this group campaign for the protection of people’s constitutional rights, the repeal of oppressive 
laws, a move away from authoritarianism, and the “separation of business from government.”19 
While the Yabloko Youth is smaller and does not appear to have as many regional branches as 
Yunarmiya claims, its political stance flies in the face of the Russian government’s current 
policies and offers young people a chance to counter the influence of groups like Yunarmiya. 
As the Russian government attempts to regain influence over its surrounding regions and 
opposes the expansion of NATO and the European Union, rekindled sentimentality for former 
Russian and Soviet greatness can cement support for such policies from Russian citizens. By 
extension, if this worldview takes hold in the youngest generations of the Russian population, the 
West may be combating such aggression for the foreseeable future. The sooner we can 
understand the motivations behind movements such as Yunarmiya, the better equipped we will 
be to understand events in Eurasia and areas of Russian influence. If nothing else, the goals and 
 
17"Молодёжное Яблоко | Санкт-Петербург." ВКонтакте. 
"О «Молодежном Яблоке» в Петербурге." ВКонтакте. Last modified June 12, 2019. 
https://m.vk.com/@spb_molyabloko-o-molodezhnom-yabloke-v-peterburge. 
 






very existence of groups such as Yunarmiya may be a symptom of greater social movements 
within Russia and Eastern Europe. 
Much of the data in this study is translated text from Yunarmiya’s website and various 
social media posts, but background must be established for appropriate context. To do so, I will 
take into consideration studies of youth in political movements, previous Russian pro-
government youth groups (since 2000, pro-government can in some cases be considered 
synonymous with pro-Putin), and the Russian government’s policies in both foreign and 
domestic spheres. To elaborate on Yunarmiya’s implications for politics and societal change in 
the future, it is necessary to construct a brief timeline of prior groups and the political change 
that took place during their lifespans. There have been a handful of studies on groups in Russia 
both supporting and opposing the policies of the Russian government that can provide insight 
into the motivations behind creating and joining the groups of the 2000s and 2010s.20 This 
research will contribute to the literature surrounding Russian pro-government youth groups and 
the timeline of Putin-supporting youth that these studies began. 
For analysis of Yunarmiya’s social media presence, the primary accounts examined here 
are two of its most active: those on VKontakte and the group’s Russian-language page on 
Instagram. VKontakte appears to be the main outlet through which Yunarmiya advertises its 
other social media accounts along with events and pages it wishes to support. This study will 
 
20These studies include:  
Jeffery Long. Putin Youth?: The Moving Together Youth Movement in Post-Soviet Russia. Master’s thesis, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2004. 
Douglas Buchacek. NASHA Pravda, NASHE Delo: The Mobilization of the Nashi Generation in Contemporary 
Russia. Master’s thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006. 
Laura Lyytikainen. Performing Political Opposition in Russia: The Case of the Youth Group Oborona. London: 
Routledge, 2016. 
Julie Hemment. Youth Politcs in Putin's Russia: Producing Patriots and Entrepreneurs. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2015. 
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also incorporate theory about the significance of symbolism in propaganda and persuasive tactics 
along with analysis of symbolism that Yunarmiya employs.21 This is particularly important, as 
the group likely exerts some of its influence by relying on well-known semiotics in Russian and 
Eastern European culture.22  
When discussing the social media content from Yunarmiya’s VKontakte and Instagram 
pages, temporal scope will be limited to June, July, and August 2019 because some of the largest 
protests in Russia since 2011 took place in late July and August over issues relating to upcoming 
Duma elections.23 Independent candidates were barred from participating in these elections with 
authorities citing inconsistencies in the voter signatures that candidates had to gather to run.24 
Some opposition leaders countered these accusations by stating that the signatures had been 
rendered invalid by the election officials themselves.25 Some United Russia candidates decided 
to run as independents in this Moscow election and none of their candidacy applications were 
denied, leading to more speculation on the fairness of the system.26 This led to unapproved 
 
21Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, (Berkeley: University of  
California Press, 1961). 
Kenneth Burke, “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle.’” The Philosophy of Literary Form, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1974), 191-220. 
 
22Yuri Lotman, "On the Semiosphere," Signs Systems Studies 33, no. 1 (2005): 205-226. 
 
23Елена Мухаметшина. "Политический кризис в Москве может усилиться." Ведомости. Last modified July 21, 
2019. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2019/07/21/806931-politicheskii-krizis. 
"Список задержанных на акции против недопуска кандидатов на выборы 27 июля 2019 года." ОВД-Инфо. 
Last modified July 27, 2019. https://ovdinfo.org/news/2019/07/27/spisok-zaderzhannyh-na-akcii-protiv-nedopuska-
kandidatov-na-vybory-27-iyulya-2019. 
 









demonstrations (most heavily in Moscow) that were considered part of a larger political crisis.27 
Many events and competitions were already planned for Yunarmiya in the summer months and 
continued despite political action, including “Army-2019” and “Victory-2019.”28 Evaluating the 
group’s online activity during this time provides insight into its leadership’s abilities to respond 
to politically charged situations while maintaining a positive image of the Russian government 
and pro-military activities.  
Ultimately, examination of the symbolism, propaganda, and rhetorical breakdown of 
Yunarmiya’s online presence will reveal a group that is trying to create a generation of children 
who have respect for personal sacrifice and military service and all the necessary skills and 
training to participate in this way of life themselves. While examples of similar tactics can be 
found in political youth groups in numerous contexts, adaptation to the online environment and 
circumstances of contemporary Russian children are part of what makes this research important. 
Yunarmiya’s online presence contributes to a climate where service to the Russian state is lauded 
and members are indirectly made to feel as if they owe themselves to service of the Russian 
nation and community. 
 This study is divided into five parts. Chapter 1 briefly discusses these events in the 
context of existing literature on youth movements as well as provide the timeline of groups in the 
Putin era. Chapter 2 explores relevant theoretical knowledge behind the construction of 
propaganda and persuasive rhetoric. Chapter 3 provides necessary background on Yunarmiya 
and analysis of the documents it provides on its website in order to understand the involvement 
 
27Леонид Гозман. "Накануне режима ЧП." Новая Газета. Last modified August 10, 2019. 
https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/08/10/81557-nakanune-rezhima-chp. 
 
28"Финал военно-спортивной игры «Победа-2019»." Юнармия. Last modified 2020. pobeda.yunarmy.ru/. 
 "Армейские Международные Игры «Арми-2019»." Юнармия. Last modified 2020. army.yunarmy.ru/. 
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of the Russian government and its policies. Chapter 4 samples and analyzes the social media 
presence and visual propaganda Yunarmiya offers and evaluates the influences from previous 
groups and the government, as well as the methods and symbolism the group is using to 
advertise its values. Finally, the conclusion provides a synthesis of findings and discusses their 















CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the political and social context in which contemporary Russian 
youth are growing up, it is necessary to dispel preconceptions upon which scholars and 
journalists in the West often rely when considering youth agency and activism. Although it is 
impossible to remove all biases that come with participation in one’s native society, discussing 
Russia’s historical background and political situation as it is pertinent to youth groups will assist 
in the examination of Yunarmiya’s website documents and social media posts. This chapter aims 
to tackle this undertaking as well as present a brief timeline of the major post-Soviet pro-
government youth groups that preceded Yunarmiya.  
The Historical Role of Russian Youth 
Young people are often the group society looks toward when expecting change or 
rebellion. Some may find this age group unbearably idealistic, but in the West people can be 
proud of the change it facilitates. When a Western viewpoint of youth in politics is applied 
universally, however, it can pose significant problems to scholarship on the matter. If academics 
apply Western social theory to other parts of the world, they will assume rationality from a 
standpoint that differs widely from the reality of the society and cultures they are studying. In the 
case of youth political involvement, if this demographic does not participate in a society deemed 




This is the conundrum present when studying the role of youth in contemporary Russian 
society. This region of the world has had a fundamentally different experience than the United 
States and Western Europe in the past century. Although Eastern Europe and Russia have had 
similar histories to, and in-depth interactions with, Western Europe throughout history, the 
impact of a combination of autocracy and Soviet-style communism has created stricter rules for 
young people’s lives even today. This is further complicated by the social change that occurred 
in the early 1990s with the fall of the Soviet Union. Both turmoil and deep tradition have 
affected the manner in which youth participate politically. Therefore, I will briefly examine 
differences between the Western view of youth roles in political action and the reality of the 
situation in Russia.  
Beginning in the nineteenth century, youth in Europe became known as the demographic 
most heavily responsible for social change due to the establishment of new nations and various 
“nationalist independence, unification, and republican movements.”29 Transitioning into the early 
twentieth century, aspects of youth that were considered “vital”  included “‘beauty, health, 
purity, energy, idealism, creativity, boldness, vision’ as well as rebelliousness and openness to 
uncertainty and transformation.”30 Leading up to the First World War, the amount of 
nationalistic youth organizations and emphasis on the importance of the youth in society were on 
the rise. The membership of these early groups may have been overexaggerated, but the romantic 
viewpoint mentioned above is a dominant narrative which is still ingrained in Western culture. 31 
These youths came to be celebrated for their vitality, especially after the devastating losses of 
 
29Mayssoun Sukareih and Stuart Tannock, Youth Rising?: The Politics of Youth in the Global Economy, (New York: 







World War I, and were later celebrated in organizations such as the Hitler Youth and Komsomol 
both for “military prowess and sacrifice of youth on the battlefield” and becoming the 
“‘vanguard’ of the socialist and proletarian revolution.”32    
 Youth therefore became tied to national identity, an emotional attachment to one’s nation 
that fosters allegiance to, and participation in, government and society.33 There are varying 
elements that bind each person to his or her nation, and feelings of belonging can take directions 
such as patriotism or nationalism (depending on the context).34 The former tends to be a more 
general love of country, while the latter is known for excluding some aspects of that country in 
the formation of what individuals may consider a “true” national identity.35 Impressionable 
young people frequently form this identity through socialization in schools. Government-run 
school systems facilitate three essential aspects of national identity formation: teaching a 
common language through which to communicate these ideals, espousing a particular curriculum 
(which includes the history of the nation in question), and including such activities as pledging 
allegiance to the flag every morning.36 The feeling of national inclusion and belonging that 
young people derive from this socialization can lead to activism in their communities, which is 
often equated with ideal citizenship both in youth and adulthood.37 This path employs the “pro-
 
32Sukareih and Tannock, Youth Rising?, 87. 
 








37Shawn Ginwright, Pedro Noguera, and Julio Cammarota, eds., Beyond Resistance!: Youth Activism and 
Community Change, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 291. 
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social view,” which is the addition of a desire to help others to the accepted belief that citizens 
should be useful and patriotic in their society, a concept often grasped early in students’ lives.38 
However, community involvement can take forms other than service to the “nation-
state.”39 Activities that benefit the community are more likely to positively involve youth.40 
Young people sometimes face stigma or are deprived of “adult” responsibilities or activities, but 
“education, school activities, and community service, for example, offer mainstream youth the 
promise of later meaningful adult activities.”41 Creating responsibilities, or delegating some to 
young people, can develop civic participation and combat the problem of political or social 
marginalization.42 Application of these ideals to Russian society reveals common ground with 
Western socialization tactics, but the presence of a different national mindset and traditional 
social responsibilities for young people. 
 Russian society experienced a markedly different twentieth century than either the United 
States or Western Europe. In centuries past, citizenship was strongly linked to the defense of the 
nation and preservation of society from invading and bordering threats.43 Then, the Soviet 
transition first in Russia and later in Eastern Europe magnified the emphasis on community 
 














responsibility. Young people were encouraged to take an “active life position” that included 
various forms of political and social engagement, as well as being steeped in Soviet culture.44  
During this period, there was little autonomy to youth participation.45 In Soviet Eastern 
Europe, there was either “strategic participation on the part of youth leaders, forced participation 
by the majority of young people, or voluntary escapism in informal youth subcultures.”46 
Svetlana Stephenson and Charles Walker note in their work on social change in the Soviet bloc 
that “under socialism, practically every aspect of young people’s lives had been structured by 
some form of state organization or agency, from their moral upbringing by the Communist 
Youth Organization [or the Komsomol, which enjoyed 40 million members at its peak] to the 
assignment of mandatory work placements through the ‘distribution’ system.”47 
Similar to Western society, school was considered the most important “agent of political 
socialization” in the Soviet Union.48 Through membership in such groups as the Komsomol and 
Pioneers (for teenagers and young children respectively), students could be socialized in a way 
that ingrained a mindset of service to the nation and excluded from certain positions in society if 
they refused participation.49  During this time, the Soviets organized new “rituals” to celebrate 
 






47Svetlana Stephenson and Charles Walker, Youth and Social Change in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 2. 
"Komsomol." Encyclopaedia Britannica. Last modified February 14, 2016. 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Komsomol. 
 
48Friedrich Kuebart. "The Political Socialization of Schoolchildren," Soviet Youth Culture, edited by Jim Riordan, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 103. 
 
49These widespread organizations were meant for the young people of the Soviet Union to participate in to learn the 
teachings of communism and prepare for Communist Party membership.  
"Komsomol." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
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and define their national lifestyle and establish milestones for Soviet life.50 For example, 
frequent meetings with veterans were intended to give students “the feeling of historical 
continuity, to help them gain an idea of the sacrifices and suffering which have formed the older 
generation but cannot be directly relived.”51 Some groups put military influences upon young 
people, such as the Pioneers, a Communist party group for young children that wore military 
uniforms and often stood watch at significant monuments.52   
 With the social and political identity of Soviet youth tied so closely to the state, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union meant devastating changes. Because involvement in these arenas 
had previously been more forced, there may be an artificial feeling of youth participation in 
Russia itself. Since this is no longer the case after the Soviet disintegration, leaders have 
perceived a large drop in such involvement.53 Commenting on the state of Russian youth after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Chernysh writes that “bereft of any stable set of values, and 
embroiled in turmoil, Russia [was] facing a kind of society-wide discussion in which the state, 
political parties, and social movements construct[ed] their own programs of social action for 
society and then eagerly await[ed] the response of the population.”54 Youth were subsequently 
isolated from politics after the Soviet collapse and “victimized” by the Russian reform process.55 
Russian young people were blamed for their lack of involvement in politics, as a dearth of 
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political participation or support for parties was considered to “reveal an ambivalence on the part 
of the young in assessing both the policies and actors” present in Russian politics at the time.56 
Attempts by post-Soviet government officials to attract and indoctrinate young people have been 
met with understandable skepticism and mistrust.57  
 Having examined the traditional place for young people in the Soviet Union and Russia, 
there are clearly pieces of Western theory about youth in politics that are applicable to Russian 
youth, such as the idea that the model citizen is good for the nation and achieves this value 
through membership in volunteer organizations and community outreach. Soviet leadership tried 
to empower youth in a way that showed the Soviet path as the most upright way to live one’s 
life. By involving youth in groups such as the Pioneers and the Komsomol, they gave children 
and teens a form of the agency that Western theory claims is critical to the development of good, 
socially responsible, politically engaged adults. Youth in Russia today still feel Soviet influences 
passed down through family, school, and higher education.58 Familial and government figures 
who were raised on these principles may feel inclined to fall back on prior experiences. With the 
Russian government returning to an authoritarian mindset, similar policies may be implemented 
for incentivizing young people to regain a feeling of Russian greatness citizens may remember 
with nostalgia.  
Previous Pro-Government Youth Movements 
In early 2014, Russian aggression during the Euromaidan movement in Ukraine disturbed 
the geopolitical circumstances of former Soviet states. The annexation of Crimea and resulting 
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war in the Donbass were blows to Ukraine unexpected in the West. After the unsuccessful 
“reset” in relations between Russian and the United States in 2009, these events contributed to 
the tension between Russia and many Western nations.59 Public attitudes toward one another 
have likewise been affected. The annexation provided an opportunity for political groups to seize 
upon divisions and increase support from their followers or to gain new adherents. These 
stirrings were the beginnings for Yunarmiya’s story.  
Since Putin was first elected, youth groups supporting either him, or his administration 
and party (United Russia), have taken shape to reflect desired responses to threats facing the 
government during the years they were active. Chronologically, these movements have been 
Moving Together, Nashi, smaller offshoots that came out of Nashi’s fall, and Yunarmiya. Each 
wave has incorporated the administration’s political agenda at its founding while adapting to the 
successes and failures of previous groups in order to understand how the Russian public receives 
ideology, events, and media presence. 
Established in 2000, Moving Together supported Putin in his early stages of power, but 
lacked a cohesive set of values because of its preoccupation with supporting him alone. It also 
became too unpredictable and controversial in its protests for many members of government to  
support it.60 Soon after Moving Together became defunct, its founder Vasily Yakemenko 
established Nashi in 2005, which could be considered a better organized version of Moving 
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Together.61 Nashi constituted a populist movement that prized itself on its ability to quickly rally 
large numbers of young people if protests resembling the Color Revolutions of other nations 
were to erupt.62 Moscow perceived the foreign revolutions as a threat and could not reassure 
itself that similar attempts would not be made against the Kremlin. Nashi enjoyed roughly seven 
years of popularity before succumbing to problems during the 2012 elections and scandals over 
bribing the media.63 
A variety of smaller movements emerged from Nashi’s fall, ranging from the militant 
group Сталь (Stal’) and a traffic politeness group named StopKham to the hipster-luring film 
and artistic organization called Сеть (Network).64 In the wake of the annexation of Crimea, 
Network assisted in prolonging the event’s popularity within Russia and emphasizing its 
connection to Putin by attracting the support of educated young people via the promise of 
resources with which they could realize their patriotic creativity.65 These are the metaphorical 
shoes that Yunarmiya must fill and hopes to surpass. The group appears to draw on some of 
these influences for ideology and strategy, as well as incorporating the image of Soviet youth 
groups.  
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This is the context out of which Yunarmiya and its predecessors have emerged. Having 
learned from its past experiences when sponsoring organizations like this, the Russian Ministry 
of Defense undoubtedly understands the need for a coherent ideological base in order to build a 
successful youth movement. Yunarmiya’s documents concerning its purposes and founding will 
be addressed in the coming chapters. To best understand both the motivations behind them and 














CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS OF PROPAGANDA 
Although each movement must adapt to the time and context in which it has emerged, 
there are patterns of effective arguments and propaganda that date back hundreds of years. The 
ideology of an organization is supported by these arguments and then advertised using symbols 
and cultural references that the target audience will understand. In order to evaluate underpinning 
strategies that Yunarmiya is using to convey its desired messages, this chapter will delve into the 
discoveries of recent scholarship on propaganda tactics, the field of semiotics, and the use of 
religious logical arguments.  
Understanding Yunarmiya’s Rhetoric and Imagery as Propaganda 
 Yunarmiya’s online presence should be understood as dissemination of propaganda. 
Association with this label does not mean the movement is malicious. By looking into the social 
media posts and website documents that Yunarmiya has posted, I will evaluate visual and textual 
propaganda aimed at Russia’s youngest generations. The convictions that Yunarmiya promotes 
are not those of adversarial wartime campaigns or insidious anti-government psychological 
warfare. They fall more heavily into the category of “directed or intentional attempts to 
‘disseminate or promote particular ideas.’”66 Yunarmiya’s objective is to “confirm rather than 
convert” by taking elements of society and history that are already present in Russian
 




culture and emphasizing their importance to further the goals that the Russian government has 
for its citizens.67 
Turning first to the visual, audiences tend to “focus on visual information because they 
see images as credible records, allowing them to ‘witness’ news events even though they 
themselves were not physically present.”68 Images and videos also appeal to a wider 
demographic range because they can be understood by young or illiterate audiences, or by 
anyone who might not understand the nuances of text in the same way.69 And while text might 
elicit strong emotions from some of the population, images can convey strong statements or 
sentiments much more efficiently.70 People are both more likely to recall visual messages alone 
and those that are “redundant across both visual and verbal channels.”71 
 The internet is a convenient medium for communicating visual propaganda to a large 
audience. Social media in particular makes networking and widespread communication relatively 
cheap and easy. Reliance on social media for publicity can help stretch a group’s resources, but 
can also serve to “reach sympathetic target audiences” and “intimidate opponents.”72 Yunarmiya 
may not have much of the competition for influence that traditional extremist groups encounter 
online, but for the purposes of this study, we can consider opposition to the Russian government 
or independent groups as competing for attention in social media communities. 
 













In addition to images, the expansion of YouTube since the mid-2000s has created another 
platform for self-publishing branded material that spreads and reinforces the messages expressed 
on their websites and other social media platforms.73 Although this study will not include an 
examination of the manner in which Yunarmiya’s YouTube videos facilitate the spread of its 
messages to young people, it is important to note the group’s involvement on the website, as 
younger generations (Millennials and Generation Z) are increasingly more attracted to websites 
such as YouTube and Instagram rather than Facebook and Twitter.74  
 Yunarmiya’s involvement in these spheres indicates that its leadership is aware of its 
young audience’s interests. Working to “engage the ‘hearts and minds’ of their audience,” the 
movement needs to capture the interest of both children and their guardians.75 To do so, 
Yunarmiya aims for its audience to understand its terms both emotionally and logically. 
Although the propaganda value of the activities and online presence organized by a state-
sponsored youth group could be dismissed as unequal to more brazen political extremist 
movements, youth groups can have subtler long-term implications for political and social 
influence. Presumably, because Yunarmiya’s target audience is children aged eight to eighteen, 
values it promotes may stick in the minds of young Russians and influence their decisions later 
in life.76 Propaganda wields meaning through logical arguments, and the next section will discuss 
a cultural understanding of meaning.  
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A Semiotic Understanding of Meaning 
 Members of a society tend to navigate relatively smoothly through its nuances. People 
understand that images and symbols hold meaning that is quickly conveyed when observing a 
picture or advertisement. Contributors to an issue of International Studies in Visual Sociology 
and Visual Anthropology note that “what we see in something…is profoundly affected by what is 
in our minds.”77 The study of this phenomenon is referred to as semiotics or structuralism.78 
Objects that hold meaning or “can be used to stand for or substitute for something else” are 
referred to as signs.79 These signs are shorthand for concepts that are culturally defined and 
understood contextually. Such principles form the foundation communication is built upon, and 
signs and symbols are the channels through which textual and visual mediums communicate 
complex messages in the context of the Russian semiosphere.  
 Semiotics exist in a system in which there are many semiospheres that overlap and each 
have their own cultural and symbolic systems. The “semiotic act” is defined as a “single 
communicative act – an exchange of communication between addressee and addressor.” 80 Each 
unique culture can be understood as a “collection of codes” for understanding the signs that its 
members encounter.81 Code learning begins in youth and is shaped largely by the people in an 
individual’s surroundings. The previous chapter discussed socialization in schools, but semiotic 
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teaching comes from each person a child encounters.82 This produces an index of officially and 
unofficially sanctioned signs in each person’s mind. For the purposes of this study, Yunarmiya is 
the addressor and its target audience of young Russians the addressee. Audience members from 
Yunarmiya’s target demographic each have a lifetime of learned signs to navigate which they 
bring to their encounters with the signs and symbolism that the group provides. 
Yuri Lotman, associated with the second wave of semiotic scholars, notes that “any 
fragment of the semiotic structure or separate text preserves the mechanisms for reconstruction 
of the whole system.”83 We are analyzing “isolated signs” when evaluating the textual and visual 
propaganda Yunarmiya presents in order to understand the “subsequent semiotic phenomena 
[that] are considered as a succession of signs” in the minds of Russian children when they see 
and interpret the organization’s online content.84 Yunarmiya strives to create a semiotic 
environment through its website and social media pages that will be the same across the Russian 
Federation and has uniform militaristic and historically reverent values even along the peripheral 
zones of the greater Russian semiosphere.  
Lotman discusses the development of a culture as viewed from inside and outside of its 
semiosphere, writing that through the “process of mutual acquaintance and inclusion into a 
specific general culture, a given culture begins to cultivate its own originality in a more acute 
fashion. In its turn, the other culture also considers it as ‘special,’ ‘unique.’ The isolated culture 
‘to itself’ is always ‘natural’ and ‘usual.’”85 The development of Yunarmiya’s specific cultural 
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context and practices is happening within a wider Russian semiosphere that we are interpreting 
from outside of that semiosphere. Elements of Yunarmiya’s public image that are striking to 
viewers who are not native to the Russian semiosphere may seem natural or less controversial to 
native Russians.  
Semiotics are important to Yunarmiya’s analysis because this field of study can help 
critics to understand the spoken and unspoken messages throughout the group’s content. 
Semiospheres cannot function without a “complex memory system” that supports all the 
understanding of meaning and communication.86 This is essential for the political and social 
memory within Russian society from which Yunarmiya extrapolates in order to create 
convincing messages. The behavior of citizens, the state, and groups functioning within this 
semiosphere is dictated by the norms that come from this collective memory.87 
The presence of the semiosphere is what allows language to function and convey 
meaning, and this is the reason semiotics must be discussed before turning to rhetorical 
arguments, as they will not carry the same weight when they are not in their original 
semiosphere.88  Not only is rhetoric intertwined with the semiosphere, but the arguments it can 
support are dependent on local semiotics, as each semiosphere has its own unique 
“personality.”89 In 20th-century discussions of semiotics, borders between each semiosphere were 
more easily defined by physical territories, but now the semiospheres extend and blend online, 
 










which makes the study of Yunarmiya’s online propaganda intriguing for the purposes of cultural 
influence. Semiospheres blending could possibly spread Yunarmiya’s messages, or those of 
other groups, past the boundaries they would traditionally have. The signs and symbols that 
Yunarmiya presents form the basis of the messages that its audience receives by interacting with 
its website or social media accounts. Rhetorical theory that I discuss below will reveal the 
manner in which young Russians understand and are compelled by the signs and symbols 
Yunarmiya offers to its online audience. 
The Role of Rhetorical Arguments  
Many of the most convincing political and social arguments find their roots in patterns of 
religious thought. Governments, social institutions, and groups such as Yunarmiya need to 
provide compelling reasons for adherence to their causes and values for their potential followers 
and recruits, as well as prove their arguments are logical.90 To understand the methods by which 
this is done, I will consider the analyses of Kenneth Burke, a critic who viewed literature as a 
“symbolic action,” and who explains the relationship of religion and state power as well as 
delving into the more controversial case of propaganda created in Hitler‘s rhetoric.91 Burke 
called his critical technique dramatism, the “analysis of language and thought as basically modes 
of action rather than as means of conveying information.”92  
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Burke wishes to understand how institutions of power convince the individual to use his 
or her free will in accordance with accepted practices of governing authorities. He expresses the 
need to understand how a “vision of the natural order can become infused with the genius of the 
verbal and socio-political orders.”93 Burke notes that people approach people and things 
differently, as people can be “‘reasoned with,’ petitioned, persuaded.”94 In his understanding of 
communication as acting, he therefore seeks to tease out the motives behind actions and what 
factors influence an individual into acting the way he or she does. Because of this approach to 
understanding rhetoric, Burke sees the world as a stage where “an act is done by an agent in a 
scene.”95 Therefore, the motivations behind both persuasion and response, both sides of 
communication examined here, can be determined by how the individual or group performs their 
roles. One can more easily understand propaganda through dramatism, as the expected roles for 
both authority and followers quickly become apparent. 
Having established the paradigm through which to understand propaganda, it is possible 
to pick apart its motives. When an authority appeals to followers or citizens, individual freedom 
presents itself as an issue, and Burke terms it as a “faculty that makes possible the choice 
between the yea-saying of Humble Obedience or the nay-saying of Prideful Disobedience.”96 
The powers that be need to establish a relationship with followers that encourages them to use 
their will in manners according to an established order and convince them that it is the side of 
reason. Burke illustrates this as harnessing the “imagination” of the people in order to make 
 










“reasonable things seem sensible, and thus inducing the Wills of persons weak in Reason to 
nonetheless freely choose, as it were reasonably, and thus to act on the side of Order, eschewing 
Temptation.” 97 This temptation would otherwise encourage an individual to act against power 
and misbehave. For children, presenting a certain narrative as correct early in a person’s life will 
have consequences for his or her worldview later in life whether or not this is a conscious effort. 
Burke observes that in this model “the idea of Reason…is obviously permeated with 
ideas of Dominion, owing to its identification with ideas of control,” which for this study is the 
Russian state and Motherland in the paradigm that Yunarmiya presents online.98 Keeping this in 
mind, Yunarmiya offers practices similar to those of mortification, a method understood as 
“exercising oneself in ‘virtue’… a systematic way of saying no to Disorder, or obediently saying 
yes to Order.”99 Burke states that mortification “must come from within,” as the “mortified must, 
with one aspect of himself, be saying no to another aspect of himself – hence the urgent incentive 
to be ‘purified’ by ‘projecting’ his conflict upon a scapegoat, by ‘passing the buck,’ by seeking a 
sacrificial vessel upon which he can vent as from without, a turmoil that is actually within.”100 
When there is no exterior scapegoat, mortification becomes the method for punishing oneself for 
disobeying. If there is a possible scapegoat besides oneself, Burke’s logic tells us that this 
scapegoat will be punished or expelled in order to make the guilty individual or group feel as 
though it has purified itself. 
 









Throughout Burke’s collected works, one can observe differing versions of the 
scapegoating process. In the case of Yunarmiya’s propaganda, factional scapegoating is the 
relevant variation, where an issue “divides individuals into camps” and then places blame on one 
of those camps to divert blame for the evils at hand.101 Writing on the use of scapegoating for the 
Western Journal of Communication, Mark Moore states that Burke’s principles can be applied to 
American politics in calls to destroy “what we believe to be the cause of disorder,” so that 
society continually revives “the role of the ancient and ever-present figure of the victim upon 
whose back we load our own evil in the belief that in sacrificing him we destroy our own 
evil.”102 Yunarmiya has no explicitly stated scapegoat, but there is a guilty faction that is implied 
throughout its website and social media accounts: the ambivalent, freeloading Russian.  
To avoid being placed in this faction, one can become good and virtuous through wider 
participation in Russian society for Yunarmiya, which wants children to be patriotic, physically 
fit, and active in their communities.103 Being virtuous (in this secular way) requires an individual 
to sacrifice parts of life that he or she otherwise might enjoy. The “sacrificial principle” is 
inherently linked to the “idea of dominion” in its ability to convince people to come together and 
give up the desire to disobey in exchange for the promise of a better future and condition of that 
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community.104 With obedience, there is the promise of reward, and with disobedience the threat 
of punishment, both administered by the institution of power.105 
One of the most infamous examples of the application of this religious logic and 
scapegoating process to political and social rhetoric is Adolf Hitler’s manifesto Mein Kampf, 
which Burke analyzes in depth and considers a “bastardization of fundamentally religious 
patterns of thought” at its core.106 It was, however, politically persuasive in its time. Throughout 
Burke’s analysis, he notes the manner in which Hitler preys upon people’s insecurities and offers 
a universal way to make their social situations better. To be convincing, one must have a 
“unifying center” to which all paths lead, offer solutions to various woes and prevent people 
from seeing the strengths of competing ideologies.107 Burke argues that Hitler “was not offering 
people a rival world view; rather, he was offering a world view to people who had no other to pit 
against it,” and this bears significance for Yunarmiya, as these are children who may be 
encountering an institutionalized belief system and worldview for the first time.108 
“Heroism” and “sacrifice” were termed the keystones of Hitler’s argument for the 
superiority of Aryans over Jewish and other people.109 The dictator defined the Aryan by his 
strength and his unique “alone-ness,” which stemmed from factors such as “inborn dignity” and 
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a willingness to give of himself for general self-preservation, whereas Jewish people were 
considered as taking resources when pursuing the same goals.110 This facet of Hitler’s rhetoric 
stresses the “prosperity of poverty” argument, that religion uses to convert setbacks and 
hindrances into something better.111 The Russian people faced devastating conflict during the 
Soviet period and the turmoil of reforming their entire society in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Struggles like this could be considered in a rhetorical sense to have purified some citizens 
through suffering while revealing “enemies” who might have embraced non-traditional or 
Western-leaning values and divided the image of a strong Russian nation.  
Having established this rhetorical dichotomy, Mein Kampf takes more steps to bring its 
readers onto the same page, namely: sharing a “projection device,” creating a narrative of 
“symbolic rebirth,” and constructing economic uses for Hitler’s ideology.112 First, projecting the 
battle outside of oneself brings the entire audience against a similar foe. Second, being reborn in 
any ideology can give the participant the impression of “moving forward, towards a goal” and 
heeding his or her “spiritual ancestors.”113 Third, economic problems are simultaneously brought 
into focus and dismissed as secondary when discussing the manner in which the Aryan is 
“constructive” by nature, but cannot “derive dignity from economic stability” alone.114 These 
principles create an image of society where people with troubled pasts can band together because 
 











of their inherent virtue to oppose an enemy that is corrupting their nation. The generally faceless 
points of this argument allow for its application in a variety of contexts. 
How These Approaches can be Applied to Yunarmiya 
 Yunarmiya is therefore a new framework for these arguments. Blending the explanations 
of the scholars above, one can see that Yunarmiya is an extension of the state in its own way, and 
disseminates its propaganda to young Russians and their parents through both rhetorical and 
visual media. The main message of such effort is expressed well by Burke, as he addresses the 
necessary “relation between leaders and followers, each group in its way fulfilling the same 
commonality of interests, as the soldiers and captains of an army share a common interest in 
victory.”115 Russian children are the soldiers in this metaphor, and the state the captains.  
 There is something to be said in regard to the specific “Russian-ness” that Yunarmiya 
wishes to present to its young audience (and their parents). To paint the movement’s ideal 
landscape: the Russian people, too, are moving toward some goal in a brighter future. There are 
sacrifices that have been made throughout the nation’s history, like those of Soviet ancestors 
who won the Great Patriotic War and should be revered by today’s young people.116 Russians 
share an “inborn dignity” of their own; their nation and families are battle-born and bloodied 
from the twentieth century, and it now falls to future generations to steward the Motherland and 
foster her growth. Russian blood ties them together, but only those who actively help the 
Motherland will be considered worthy to lead her forward. A myriad of Yunarmiya’s images and 
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rhetoric mention the march to victory, and the organization is more than willing to show young 
people how to accomplish this.117 Once recruits complete their training and schooling, enlistment 
in the Russian armed forces is often glorified and publicized on Yunarmiya’s social media 
accounts. Both children and their guardians will already feel as though they owe the Russian 
state their service to do so, as the Russian Ministry of Defense has helped them learn skills and 
gain respect among their peers. Having been coached in the ways their ancestors bled for their 
community, Yunarmiya’s members may come to the conclusion that there is no path more noble. 
 While movements from previous years truly played on having their own “Rome” and 
“devil” (as Burke phrases it) by vilifying Western influence or lack of direction in the youth of 
the 1990s, Yunarmiya’s devil, as previously mentioned, is implied.118 The negative and 
combative language other groups wielded does not tend to raise its head in Yunarmiya’s online 
content. Its devil, its scapegoat, is not so much the active choice to be disobedient and stray from 
Russian influence, but rather to be left behind in the march forward. To remain unpatriotic, 
inactive in one’s community, and without some level of expertise in military training (or any of 
the other skills Yunarmiya markets to its young audience) is the true fall from grace in this 
context. All of Yunarmiya’s marketing shows the extent to which the Russian state has provided 
for and educated young Russians. If one does not choose to participate militarily or patriotically, 
especially if they enjoyed the benefits of membership, they have become part of the undesirable, 
ungrateful faction. Yunarmiya may construct its persuasiveness from bandwagon and patriotic 
advertising techniques, but its propaganda structure rests firmly on a foundation of long-studied 
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semiotic and linguistic artistry. Chapter 3 will delve further into the movement’s origins and 

















CHAPTER 3: YUNARMIYA’S BACKGROUND AND WEBSITE DOCUMENTS 
Yunarmiya has been closely affiliated with the Russian state since its founding and the 
Russian Ministry of Defense has been happy to take the movement under its wing.119 In October 
2015, Putin signed the 536th Russian Presidential decree, which focuses on the creation of 
organizations that could shape the character of young Russians to match what the Russian 
government considered the country’s official values.120 Although there was hesitation in the past 
to be closely tied to particular government officials after Moving Together’s mistakes, 
Yunarmiya has been quick to embrace supervision. Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Minister of 
Defense, has remained closely involved with Yunarmiya’s growth and is credited by some 
sources as its founder.121 He denied accusations about the organization’s role in attempts to 
militarize the Russian population, but did hint in 2016 that the movement carried a “long-term” 
and “important” significance for Russians.122  
It is important to note that Yunarmiya’s website is not a trustworthy source for statistics 
on group membership or execution of the events that it advertises. The nature of this group 
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makes its propaganda one of its largest assets, and therefore the information examined here 
should be taken with a grain of salt. Yunarmiya can claim efficiency and a variety of successes, 
but because this study does not incorporate interviews or field work to engage this organization 
further, the reality of the situation remains murky. Regardless of reliability, however, the website 
is an apt source for evaluating the group’s desired reputation. 
Russian young people involved in Moving Together exhibited a variety of motivations 
when joining, including boredom and desire to use the resources available with membership.123 
When reading Yunarmiya’s texts or information from separate news outlets, it is necessary to 
keep in mind that voluntary youth groups such as this cannot control their members and likely 
are not as strict or efficient as they claim or appear in media coverage. Because the group may 
not be as large or have as broad a reach as it claims, this research is focused on the image and 
purposes Yunarmiya wishes to set forth for young Russians.  
Yunarmiya claims to have been founded under the cooperation of Valery Vostrotin, 
Valentina Tereshkova, Svetlana Khorkina, Arthur Chilingarov, and the organizations of the All-
Russian Public Organization of Veterans of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (OOOV 
AF RF) and the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy 
(DOSAAF).124 Each of these individuals bring their fame and proximity to the state to 
Yunarmiya’s reputation. Tereshkova is a former cosmonaut, the first female in space, and hero of 
the Soviet Union affiliated with Putin’s political party, Vostrotin is a veteran and member of the 
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Duma, Khorkina is a renowned retired Olympic gymnast, and Chilingarov is a polar explorer and 
former member of the Duma recognized as a hero of the Russian Federation.125 
Children can easily see these figures as role models who support the ideas that 
Yunarmiya encourages such as a healthy lifestyle and involvement in sports, rather than solely 
the military training that otherwise pervades the group’s activities. Their successes stem from 
acts of service to the Soviet Union or Russian Federation, which may influence young admirers. 
The involvement of the OOOV AF RF and DOSAAF also plays heavily into Russian traditions. 
Connected to the Ministry of Defense, the OOOV AF RF stresses the duty to revere the 
generation that defeated the Nazis in combat and to respect servicemen and women of all ages.126 
The DOSAAF is a former Soviet sporting organization with militaristic focuses such as weapon 
training and aviation.127 It is over ninety years old, and the traditions that its involvement bring 
are a further testament to the legitimacy the Russian government wishes to lend to Yunarmiya. 
The current chief of Yunarmiya’s main headquarters, Roman Romanenko, fits the model 
of these personalities perfectly. A former cosmonaut, Romanenko is also a deputy in the Russian 
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Duma for United Russia.128  Romanenko began his term of service there in 2016 and took over 
the responsibility for Yunarmiya in mid-2018.129 His images are often featured on the social 
media accounts, and he is presented as a positive role model for young members rather than as an 
administrator. He is often engaged in public relations and appears as the patriarch of the 
movement when representing Yunarmiya and endorsing the group’s cooperating organizations. 
The significance and nuanced semiotics surrounding his depiction will be discussed further in the 
following chapter.  
It is likely that Yunarmiya reminds older Russians of Soviet organizations such as the 
Pioneers or the Komsomol, but this does not exclude the possibility of making a fresh impression 
on young people. Nostalgia plays a role in recruitment, as reclaiming the glory some Russians 
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Figure 1: Cover image for the Ministry of Defense's page on Yunarmiya. 
Source: “Всероссийское Военно-Патриотическое Общественное Движение «Юнармия».” Министерство 




may believe their nation possessed during the Soviet period may appeal to older generations 
giving children permission to join. The presence of figures such as Tereshkova and involvement 
of both the DOSAAF and veteran’s organization reminds people that feats achieved under the 
Soviet Union could be replicated or surpassed.  
Soviet nostalgia comes to fore in the image of Yunarmiya’s young members. Where its 
appearance is concerned, the Ministry of Defense provides news and photos of the group 
members, as well as a detailed visual description of the standard uniform, which is designed to 
look like casual military attire and invokes memory of the Pioneers.130 Media presence fulfills 
the need to create a recognizable image for readers. Yunarmiya appears to be more concerned 
with recruitment and ideological cohesion than movements in the past, and government 
assistance is no small advantage. Because of its close connections with the government, 
Yunarmiya may enjoy access to more resources than some of its predecessors.  
Website Documents: Yunarmiya’s Purposes and Desired Image 
  In this section, I will discuss Yunarmiya’s webpage in order to assess its intentions and 
sources of influence. The wealth of information, publications, and events that Yunarmiya 
presents is staggering and conveys the impression of a large and well-organized movement. 
There are yearly activity plans, various documents on positions available within the organization, 
and documents on the programs and events the group has completed or plans to run.131Although 
the organization emphasizes military training, a pronounced cultural aspect has taken root in its 
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educational approach. Yunarmiya provides two copies of textbooks on the development of world 
culture, beginning with the first known art created by humans and proceeding to present day.132 
This plethora of documents (and the narratives offered in them) will be beneficial for further 
study, but the “About Yunarmiya” and “Main Headquarters” pages are the primary sections 
examined here. 
 The “About the Yunarmiya Movement” page presents a short overview of the group’s 
purposes. Its website advertises assistance in the development and patriotic education of Russian 
citizens from the ages of eight to eighteen with their guardians’ permission.133 The group’s claim 
of rapid growth indicates that many young Russians meet the criteria for membership, and the 
website states that eighty-five regions have open branches across the Russian Federation and 
there are currently 700,000 members who have participated in 10,000 events.134 Yunarmiya has 
updated its website in the past year to include a more detailed explanation of the development it 
offers to members than was originally present. The education the movement wishes to impart to 
these young people spans more than just patriotic subjects. Four areas in which Yunarmiya 
maintains that it will contribute to the personal development of each child in its program are 
“spiritual-moral development,” “social development,” “physical development and sports,” and 
“intellectual development.”135 The third and fourth sections are laden with military skills and 
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activities, as one of its purposes is giving such experiences to boys and girls and preparing young 
men in particular for military service.136 
 Perhaps the most notable of the four is the “spiritual-moral” development Yunarmiya 
expects its programs to foster in Russian children. The website claims that it will help them “to 
achieve a valuable orientation, form a moral position, and discover the spiritual potential of one's 
identity.”137 It includes several aspects of that moral character that it wishes to grow, including 
“kindness, empathy, conscientiousness, honesty, loyalty, dignity, love for the Motherland, and 
culture,” as well as mentioning “environmentally-friendly awareness” and respectful familial 
relations in the same breath.138 Also recently updated, this section formerly entwined Russia’s 
history with Yunarmiya’s ideal moral positions for young people.139  
While the features listed above form a broader interpretation of characteristics that are 
helpful to Russian communities, love of country is still emphasized not as an intellectual or 
political stance, but as a spiritual necessity. This is reminiscent of the sentiments Burke selects 
from Mein Kampf to illustrate ties between religious and political loyalty arguments. Finding the 
“spiritual potential of one’s identity” is also a somewhat confusing phrase when discussing 
national identity or politics. Revision of the principles and development section gives the 
impression that Yunarmiya’s leadership may have encountered some resistance over rhetoric that 
took too hard-lined an approach to Russian identity and moral standpoints. Asserting that there is 











uncommon among pro-Putin and pro-government youth groups seeking to create their own 
secular ideologies.  
Social development includes the importance of taking “responsibility for one's own 
behavior and actions, initiative, independence.”140 This self-sufficiency is described as 
characterizing “real citizenship of one’s nation,” and this brings to mind the principle of the 
alone-ness of the “strong man” (or Aryan) that Burke discussed when evaluating Mein Kampf.141 
Not only are the young recruits expected to develop their own social skills in this respect, but 
also to discuss the problems and development of contemporary Russian society.142 Cadets are 
expected to find their confidence and “path” by working to contribute to their community.143 The 
desire to contribute to social confidence is common among many youth groups, but emphasis on 
using this skill to be the ideal Russian citizen sets Yunarmiya apart.  
In the past year, Yunarmiya has revised this social aspect from one that focused on 
combating extremism in Russian society by more effectively socializing children.144 Its approach 
to “extremism” did not imply education on the dangers of ideological extremism seen in a 
variety of cultures, but teaching young members to actively oppose and work against extremism 
developing within Russian society towards the state’s detriment. Teaching children as young as 
eight about extremism and shaping their opinions on the nature of such a broad concept has the 
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potential to influence the nature of future public discourse on which policies and ideologies are 
considered dangerous in Russian society. 
Yunarmiya’s page then discusses one of its most lauded points of development: physical 
fitness and sports. Although the movement is heavily based in military training and preparation, 
this study has already mentioned the extent to which this approach is usually framed in public 
relations as an attempt to keep young people both physically fit and socially conscious. The 
group’s website claims that “sports develop physical form and excellently compensate for sitting 
at school desks and computers for many hours.”145 Through “participation in [Yunarmiya’s] 
competitions and in sports games,” members will become “strong, agile, and hardy” as well as 
develop “team spirit” and “skills of well-coordinated interaction with the collective.”146 The last 
phrase calls to mind the language of participation in the Soviet Union.  
 Finally, Yunarmiya discusses the benefits of its efforts toward “intellectual 
development.” Claiming to offer a variety of critical thinking skills, the group states that 
membership and participation foster “the ability to analyze historical processes and events, to 
make independent conclusions and generalizations, and… [to] develop public speaking skills, 
allowing one to easily and freely communicate.”147 Interestingly, this is the subheading under 
which Yunarmiya files its pro-service career path, which was previously explained in the sports 
section.148 The movement states that it “forms positive motivation for fulfillment of 
 










constitutional duty and prepares young people for service in the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation,” and boasts that after graduation from school, its members proceed to “the country’s 
leading military universities, where they receive free higher education and social support of the 
Ministry of Defense .”149 Training young people for military service in programs like this is an 
approach distinct from those of Russia’s surrounding nations, and this raises questions about 
threats the Russian government sees in its future. Keeping with the patterns of previous 
movements, Yunarmiya’s overall aim is increased involvement with civil society in ways in 
which the Russian political administration and Ministry of Defense see fit.  
The Yunarmiya Oath and Hymn 
Filling the role of a practice military organization for children, Yunarmiya’s recruits 
swore themselves in when joining in 2019. The text of the original Yunarmiya oath has been 
removed from its website, but a shortened version from the Ministry of Defense’s website reads: 
“I swear to strive for victories in education and sports, to lead a healthy lifestyle, to prepare 
myself for service and creation for the benefit of the Fatherland, to honor the memory of the 
heroes who fought for the freedom and independence of our country, to be a patriot and a worthy 
citizen of Russia.”150 
 
Comparing versions of Yunarmiya’s oath from the Ministry of Defense’s website and 
Yunarmiya’s own, the former clearly does not reveal the extent of the devotion to the 
“Fatherland” that Yunarmiya actually stresses.151 It is important to note that the preparation for 
military service as displayed by Yunarmiya’s online presence is downplayed in the version of the 
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oath above. The main goal of this statement is personal betterment for the next generation of 
young Russians. Becoming a productive member of society who exhibits patriotism and a 
healthy lifestyle is a surface-level goal undoubtedly attractive to parents. While some of the 
sentiment remains, this iteration of the oath reduces the implication that children who join owe 
themselves and their service to the state in some capacity. In attitude, work, or spirit, Yunarmiya 
aims to cement allegiance to the Russian government under the guise of upright community 
involvement. 
Yunarmiya’s full version, the “Oath of the Young Army Man” (“Клятва Юнармейца”), 
encompasses a variety of points not previously mentioned, including loyalty to the Fatherland, 
the “brotherhood of Yunarmiya,” and the need “to follow the traditions of valor, courage, and 
camaraderie.”152 Removing the oath could be an attempt to further distance itself from previous 
groups and the implication that its intentions encompass more than personal development for 
each young member. Though it is impossible to ascertain whether this version of the oath is still 
in use, it was present in Yunarmiya’s literature during the period this study analyzes, and its tone 
and symbolism necessitate inclusion in this study. The new recruits previously vowed to be a 
“defender of the weak, overcome all obstacles in the struggle for truth and justice,” follow a 
healthy lifestyle, and prepare themselves for military training or service.153  
Emphasis is present on service to the other members of Yunarmiya and the Russian state. 
By swearing to uphold traditional military valor, the recruit is meant to feel the significance of a 







must strive to appear as a respected institution to be taken seriously. It is a social training ground, 
though, for young people who will think of themselves as loyal to the state if they choose to join 
Yunarmiya. Young recruits will not be playing army as a game in the programs that the group 
offers, but will be trained to understand military technology and influenced by the principles and 
experience of a military lifestyle they may be guilted into embracing. 
Another theme is standing guard as a “defender of the weak,” which is not given specific 
definition and could therefore apply to different groups of people within and outside of the 
Russian Federation.154 Malleability of such phrases is convenient for shaping public opinion 
about domestic politics and international relations. Depending on which social or political group 
Yunarmiya wants to frame as the “weak,” it could influence members to support policies about 
protecting Russian minorities in foreign countries or defending more conservative values and 
groups in the domestic arena. This argument has been utilized as well by present-day 
conservative populist politicians in Eastern Europe and can be seen in the analysis Burke offers 
for Mein Kampf. 
The populist side of this argument lies in categorizing the “people” who require defense 
from whatever malicious forces are at work against them. Commenting on the development of 
narratives by authoritarian-leaning states, political scientist Zsolt Enyedi of Central European 
University describes the “innovations” that leaders have developed in recent years.155 These 
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having a major role in guarding the cultural and economic interests of the people.156 The Russian 
government would, in this case, have the role of deciding which groups constitute the “people” 
and what the interests of those people are. Some scholars may even consider these arguments to 
fall under the breed of “ethnopopulism,” as there are undercurrents in Yunarmiya’s language and 
behavior that suggest it wishes to facilitate the Russian government’s defense of the nation and 
culture.157 By focusing on honoring those who served and fell in Russian and Soviet military 
campaigns, Yunarmiya helps to create a generation of children who have respect for personal 
sacrifice and military service and the skills and training to participate in this way of life 
themselves.  
Burke’s interpretation of the rhetoric present in Mein Kampf bolsters this focus on the 
people. By applying his analysis, we can see that the Russian nation is made out to be something 
holy that binds those born into it together. Because of the Russian blood spilled and suffering 
endured by those that have come before Yunarmiya members, and the constant reminders of the 
inherent greatness of the Russian spirit, recruits and their peers may feel they must contribute to 
this legacy. Although Yunarmiya has changed its developmental areas and dropped its oath from 
the revised website, language and images surrounding the defense of the Fatherland and love for 
the Motherland are still widespread throughout the website and social media accounts. 
As noted in Burke’s essay on “Hitler’s ‘Battle,’” this strategy may seem new for today’s 
generations, but such arguments have been present for some time. Burke’s “strong man” rises to 
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defend the nation from an unknown enemy.158 The reader must infer who or what the enemy that 
Yunarmiya rallies against is. Populist arguments would suggest that this is the West or 
opposition (foreign or domestic), which are certainly relevant, but it is also a rally against one’s 
own inaction and unwillingness to contribute to the state’s interests.159 The implications present 
in Hitler’s lines of logic are not at odds with this behavior, but in fact support it. The Aryans that 
he describes as having inherent dignity and a willingness to sacrifice for the salvation of their 
community are the same as the Russian children that become Yunarmiya’s recruits. The military 
culture that the movement both creates for new generations and reveres in older ones fosters that 
same willingness to give to one’s community and lead it forward in the ways mentioned both in 
previously discussed rhetorical arguments and historical background of the region, and this 
places responsibility on the young as well as the old. Both Yunarmiya’s oath and hymn from the 
summer months of 2019 lay the group’s use of these principles out in the open.  
In the 2019 version of Yunarmiya’s website, its oath was followed by its hymn, called 
“To Serve Russia” (“Служить России”). It celebrated the defense of the “Fatherland” and 
referred to the whole of Russia as an “army family” that comes together in rough times without 
fear.160 Yunarmiya has made videos to the tune of this hymn and attempted to demonstrate the 
glory it describes.161 It began by setting the scene of a wall lined with military achievements, 
awards, and old glorified banners, calling back the nostalgic feeling that Russia was greater in its 
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past.162 While the era these awards came from was not explicitly mentioned, Russians were 
likely to understand this as a reference to the generation that faced World War II.  
Russian soldiers and citizens were bound together in the hymn to “serve Russia” where a 
“new sun rises in the blue sky.”163 The songwriter Ilya Reznik phrased the participants as being 
“destined” to this fate, writing that the “military way” would not be easy, that they would need to 
meet it with courage, and that all soldiers and commanders (metaphorical or not) were 
connected.164 The language used here hints that the Kremlin, and by extension Yunarmiya, 
believes it has a threat in its immediate future. The emphasis on the difficult military road ahead 
seems to create a paranoia in the observer and the singers alike. Relationships between the 
people, soldiers, and officers are familiar concepts in the rhetoric of “Hitler’s ‘Battle,’” where 
Burke highlights the necessary interactions of leaders and followers as soldiers and their 
commanders moving toward a common victory.165 The metaphor reinforces the hierarchy of 
leadership that citizens must play their part to further the nation’s (vague) interests. If people 
think they are doing something matters in an interesting way, they can be united against an 
enemy and help benefit the Russian government. Yunarmiya heavily emphasizes the sacrifice 
that Word War II veterans made for their country and provides an avenue for children to make a 
difference in the same way. 
Throughout the oath and hymn, Yunarmiya is constantly alluding to some obscure force 
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the “weak.” However, without outlining what these threats may be, the concern inspired by these 
documents leaves much to the mind of the reader or listener and he or she may be tempted to fill 
the blanks with whatever concerns about his or her society are most worrying. The blanket 
message to remain vigilant and prepared is not reassuring and may suggest that neighboring 
countries and the West consider the need for such an approach. 
These texts attempt to bind all Russian citizens together in an almost Soviet-like manner, 
and hearkens to mind images of the Red Army during World War II, when many were sacrificed 
and there were no options but to fight for survival. It is possible that framing the oath and hymn 
like this suggests that the founders and their patrons (namely the Russian government and 
perhaps Putin directly) would like the Russian populace to begin thinking in terms of an us-
versus-them mentality. The “them” in this situation is difficult to pinpoint, but could be as broad 
as resisting foreign cooperation, or as specific as targeting certain groups or officials in or 
outside Russia. Teaching this mindset to children has the potential to complicate endeavors at 
cooperation with the United States and Europe for decades to come.  
Finally, Yunarmiya’s former website included a more detailed look at its administration. 
If the page was to be believed, the movement enjoyed a highly centralized structure for its 
organizational staff and planning in 2019. Last year, the headquarters oversaw coordination, 
planning, security, and execution of activities for the regional offices.166 It comprised five 
“directorates” that handled regional programs, logistical support, security and event 
management, public relations, and social programs.167 Now, the website has changed to simply 
 






give contact information for the headquarters and list employees, whose professional 
descriptions range from the directing heads of Yunarmiya to those such as “Olympic 
champion.”168 This change may be an attempt to obfuscate which officials are directly 
responsible for each activity. Maintaining positive relations with the media and outside parties 
has been especially challenging for previous groups, and while Nashi learned to function within 
this public space after Moving Together’s failures to do so, and this lesson has undoubtedly 
outlived both groups.169 
From the information provided on its website, it is possible to observe how the group has 
learned from the mistakes of previous groups while at the same time adapting their more 
successful points. Analysis of these documents provides a detailed glimpse into Yunarmiya’s 
core missions and desires. While the website has made changes in its core messages since the 
period this study focuses on, it is still possible to examine rhetorical influences and identify 
patterns of thought common to authoritarian and populist politicians. By examining Yunarmiya’s 
social media posts, it will be possible to examine any discrepancies between what the movement 
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CHAPTER 4: YUNARMIYA’S SOCIAL MEDIA PRESENCE 
 In this chapter, I examine Yunarmiya’s VKontakte and Russian-language Instagram posts 
from June, July, and August 2019. Many of the rhetorical, semiotic, and historical discussions 
that this study has encompassed find their roots in aging arguments or events already fading from 
the memory of younger generations. Therefore, Yunarmiya faces the complicated task of 
managing its social media presence in a manner that attracts young people to traditional values 
through advertisement over the internet.  
Yunarmiya has enjoyed relative success, though, using tactics and symbols that bring 
these influences to the fore once again. It currently enjoys over 58,000 followers on VKontakte 
and approximately 20,400 on its Russian-language Instagram.170 Posts on these pages during the 
summer of 2019 are overwhelmingly focused on military competitions and veteran 
memorialization. However, there are some points at which Yunarmiya’s leadership addresses 
protest. This chapter explores the themes of military and media training, memorial and military 
service culture, and response to current events by analyzing its activities in the abbreviated 
framework of communication in social media. This format in which social media posts are 
created makes choice of images and succinct but powerful language all the more important. 
Many of Yunarmiya’s posts are similar on VKontakte and Instagram, but some variation exists.
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Posts stating what the movement believes it offers for young members and responding to 
criticism are identical across accounts. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the summer months of 2019 were a politically 
turbulent time for the Russian government as protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg developed 
against the repression of opposition 
candidates. Although Yunarmiya is not tied 
to a political party per se, one cannot forget 
the role of leader Roman Romanenko as an 
acting Duma deputy for Putin’s United 
Russia or Sergei Shoigu’s influence. Its 
social media posts put forth a largely 
unwavering image of strength in Russian 
communities throughout the turmoil, 
undoubtedly an intentional move on the 
part of Yunarmiya’s administration, but 
one that sets it apart from previous pro-government youth movements. Provocative protests, 
counter protests, and online responses to opposition (or figures that they disapproved of) were 
common to Moving Together, Nashi, and Network.171 Yunarmiya turns the other cheek in this 
sense, and instead attempts to turn its attention and public persona toward national unity.  
 
171These groups have a long history of bold public responses. Members of Moving Together threw literature they 
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Figure 2: Yunarmiya's logo.  




Military Training  
 Whether it comes through outdoor exercises, national organized games, or “master 
classes” where specialized topics are covered, the most obvious theme throughout Yunarmiya’s 
social media is a constant focus on military training.172 Beyond the various camps and programs 
that recruits can participate in, there are larger events which occupy the summer months in 
planning and scope called “Army-2019” and “Victory-2019” (detailed in the 2019 version of 
Yunarmiya’s website). “Army-2019” was claimed to have more than 3,000 participants from 
thirty-nine countries who were able to compete in arenas such as shooting and dog training.173 
“Victory-2019” took place in “Patriot” park, in which the group organizes many programs, with 
seventy-eight teams of Yunarmiya members and six different competitions.174 VKontakte posts 
allege that more than 800 members from all eighty-five regions found a way to participate.175  
 Common military skills members learn include drill training, assembly and disassembly 
of Kalashnikov rifles, knife throwing, fire safety, and military first aid, but Yunarmiya events 
can range from sporting events to training with robotics and drones. 176 Funding for many of 
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these programs comes from sources of questionable influence, including Sberbank (claimed to be 
the largest bank in Russia), presidential grants, and cooperation agreements with defense 
industries.177 Over 50 percent of Sberbank’s stocks are owned by the Bank of Russia, and the 
government business enjoys having its name 
dropped throughout posts on Yunarmiya’s 
social media.178 Involving the group further 
with state-owned enterprises, Roman 
Romanenko was reported signing cooperation 
agreements with the “Russian defense 
industry” for Yunarmiya in June 2019.179   
Lessons corresponding to professions 
in the defense industry or public services find 
themselves among military activities, including 
first responder training, forensic analysis, and 
civil engineering, with programs being named after career paths, such as “Young Rescuer” or 
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Figure 3: Cadets lined up for parachute training. 
Source: "ЮНАРМИЯ." Instagram post. Last modified 




“Young Firefighter” (names are evocative of the young Pioneers).180 The movement encourages 
application of skills learned in Yunarmiya’s ranks to participants’ futures whether they join the 
military or not. Less conventional skills are sprinkled in with mainstream sports and outdoor 
activities like laser tag, hiking, and small arms combat, such as parachute training, flamethrower 
operation, and “radiation protection.”181 Emphasis on the importance of military intelligence in 
conjunction with the rest of the primarily physical training finds its way into some posts, opening 
a variety of avenues for children and teens to explore when finding their “specialties.”182 
 According to these social media accounts, there is an assortment of camps at the 
movement’s disposal, such as the “Patriot” park or camp “Azure.”183 Life in the field and camps 
is certainly romanticized on social media. Both rhetoric and imagery come into play to make this 
happen. Phrasing around military life can be playful, such as when the Instagram account noted 
that 140 Yunarmiya members were able to experience “all the delights” of life in the field.184 
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However, the glorification of this lifestyle is not lost on the social media coordinators, and they 
have even mentioned this directly, creating an idyllic and heroic image for this activity.185 
Recalling the propaganda analysis of chapter 2, Yunarmiya is constructing a reputation for its 
members and Russian nationalism through both rhetoric and imagery, which is proved to have a 
higher rate of recall among audience members. 
Much of this imagery depicts strong leadership figures and uniformed children either 
smiling and enjoying the successes that come with participation in their local Yunarmiya branch 
or stone-faced and resolutely carrying out their duties in military formation. As shown in the first 
image above, these children are orderly and happy as they carry their banner. The children and 
teens in the photo of parachute training look steady and unafraid. Romanticized military life also 
carries the possibility of convincing children and their parents that this type of lifestyle will give 
them more social confidence and make them respectable among their peers. To call Burke’s 
dramatism forward again, these children are literally playing army and performing the roles they 
think are expected of them for participating. The power of peer pressure among youth cannot be 
forgotten, because although Yunarmiya’s leadership can influence those who participate or 
follow their accounts online, children, teens, and parents who come in contact with those 
participants will also be subjected to the movement’s influence. Recruitment becomes appealing 
both through Yunarmiya’s online presence and popular word of mouth. 
Media Training 
 When studying the photos from Yunarmiya’s VKontakte and Instagram accounts, 
noticeable patterns emerge. The movement employs propaganda strategies discussed in chapter 
 




2, and most conspicuously the branding of images with Yunarmiya’s logo. Members are always 
in an orderly formation, looking fit and prepared for their coming training. If leaders are present 
in images, they are photographed in a way that draws the eye to their bearing, and they are often 
surrounded by supporting Yunarmiya members. The movement’s administration is conscious of 
the methodology behind creating striking, memorable symbolism that will stick in the viewer’s 
mind, and proceeds to repeat these posts across its social media accounts. 
Yunarmiya recognizes the need to pass its understanding of media strategies and 
production along to its members. To foster lasting influence, it encourages members to both 
participate in military-sport activities and assist in the creation and dissemination of media about 
these experiences. Therefore, many of the movement’s events include an element of media and 
journalistic training and role playing. Yunarmiya begins participant selection for such events by 
finding the applicants with the best academic, sports, and communication skills, the members 
considered “leaders of public opinion.”186 Offering education spanning different media fields, 
Yunarmiya includes workshops where recruits learned about the “life hacks of social media 
websites” and how to devise posts, while also assisting members making movies about the 
“heroes” of WWII.187 Members are not simply playing army at this point; they are playing at 
becoming propagandists. Yunarmiya therefore begins a new generation of media specialists to 
staff government-owned news outlets. 
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 Training in this area ranges from information sessions on content formulation, such as an 
event called “How to Make Content for YouTube,” lessons by the TV channel Zvezda (owned 
by the Russian Ministry of Defense) on how to “make news,” and schooling in the “art of 
reporting.”188 Recruits have learned about the production of a Russian show “Polite People,” 
which is meant, according to Yunarmiya, to demonstrate how the show’s developers used 
“tricks” to make sure that people understood the “power of [the Russian] army.”189  
Referred to originally as the “little green men” because they operated without national 
insignias, the “polite people” (as they are now called in Russia) were the Russian soldiers who 
assisted in the annexation of Crimea in 2014.190 The “polite people” can be understood as a sign 
in the Russian semiosphere that conveys the efficiency and unpredictability on the part of the 
state in achieving its goals. Therefore, invoking a relationship to them could create the 
impression that Yunarmiya seeks to combine the ideological cohesion of a unified and patriotic 
movement with the competency of Russian special forces.  
Encouraging recruits to emulate the “polite people” suggests that members who continue 
on to military service may wish to participate in specialized operations as well. This further 
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contributes to my analysis that Yunarmiya’s glorification of recruitment may assist in filling the 
need for recruits more skilled than those who are drafted. Whether they admire the soldiers who 
invade quickly, or the media production specialists exploiting the event for its full propaganda 
value, programs such as this visit to the television channel contribute to future propaganda 
efforts. 
The events at “Victory-2019” include video competitions and creative networking events, 
where the members were encouraged to shoot videos and conduct interviews, and place emphasis 
on media production and other skills which traditionally do not fall into a soldier’s specialties.191 
Yunarmiya’s Instagram page calls “Business Card,” which took place in the course of the event’s 
activities, the most “creative” of its competitions.192 Along with these projects, specific programs 
are set aside for the members which imitate the “Young rescuer” or “Young firefighter” 
programs for specialized professions. This includes the “School of Military Correspondents,” 
which was advertised throughout the summer, but began recruiting in August under the title of 
“Young Correspondents” for children between the ages of twelve and seventeen to learn about 
the equipment and production present in media work.193  
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In some cases, Yunarmiya shows a rather bizarre hand by using attention-grabbing 
strategies to drum up interest for courses deemed necessary for young people to learn, but which 
may not initially spark their interest. While advertising collaboration courses for a program 
called “Business Class,” which it says is presented by Google and Sberbank, it references the 
collaboration between Adidas and Kanye West.194 Adidas and Kanye West appear to have no 
connection to Yunarmiya’s activities, but these names are dropped at the opening of the post’s 
caption advertising this program. It would seem that in the cases where military glory is not 
enough of a motivation for education, Yunarmiya is willing to branch out and rely on Western 
pop culture references.  
Memorials, Veterans, and Military Culture 
At the crossroads of military and media production skills lie cultural components that the 
leaders of Yunarmiya and their government counterparts wish to pass on both to the members of 
Yunarmiya and their online audience. As previously mentioned, presidential grants are involved 
in funding military and historical education about the “Fatherland,” a pervasive theme on 
VKontakte and Instagram. 195 Sergei Shoigu’s role in Yunarmiya’s development and 
maintenance has not been smoothed over like some original texts on the movement’s website. He 
opened the “Army-2019” games and has reviewed iterations of Yunarmiya uniforms.196 
Romanenko’s position as chief of Yunarmiya’s headquarters has not been challenged by 
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Shoigu’s continued involvement, but rather cements the former’s power of influence. 
Romanenko appears frequently to represent Yunarmiya’s interests in meetings with partner 
organizations or veterans. He participated in an event called “Dialogue with Heroes” and was 
highlighted for his recognition as a Hero of Russia, further enforcing his position as a role 
model.197  
The audience can feel the desire to establish trustworthiness as an authority with young 
people in a variety of posts where leaders openly display their interest in winning the confidence 
of Russian youth. In gatherings with government officials, Yunarmiya stated that “these 
meetings allow one to establish trusting relationships with teenagers, to hear their opinions and 
keep up with them.”198 Yunarmiya is overwhelmingly geared toward fostering social 
relationships between young people and the government. Rocky years in the 1990s reinforced the 
feeling that young people had become indifferent to their country and the situation of their 
community. Youth became dissatisfied with, and felt resentment towards, them and felt helpless 
during this period because of the lack of opportunities and economic stability that pervaded the 
Russian Federation in its early years. While the youth movements that came before Yunarmiya 
certainly addressed this feeling through policies and rhetoric of their own, Yunarmiya once again 
proves itself more subtle in its attempts to remove the remnants of such sentiments, which may 
have taken hold in a second generation if the youth of the 1990s did not see improvement in its 
individual situations. 
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However, this unspoken purpose occasionally peeks through Yunarmiya’s façade of 
blatant patriotism. In reference to the “Victory-2019” games, its Instagram page notes that 
seventy-eight of the eighty-five regions competed for the “single purpose of showing that the 
nation can be proud of its teenagers.”199 Phrases like this allude to societal frustration with what 
could be considered self-serving behavior 
of the 1990s and 2000s coming into 
conflict with the traditional beliefs 
discussed in previous chapters, where 
young people were responsible for 
protection of and contribution to the 
communities in which they lived. Burke’s 
commentary on tactics in Hitler’s rhetoric 
are germane to this analysis; individualism 
versus the interest of the collective are 
themes present in both former Soviet 
ideology and the arguments in Mein Kampf. Burke highlighted favoritism of the communal 
Aryan society over the greed and individualistic behavior vilified in Hitler’s case.200  
Yunarmiya contributes to an effort to paint the Russian Federation as heir to a deep 
historical legacy of military prowess and societal cohesion. Celebrations of ancient victories date 
back to the 855th anniversary of victory in the battle of the Voronezh river.201 In more 
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contemporary history, Yunarmiya takes time to highlight the sacrifices of those who died in 
conflicts from the 19th century forward. In August, the group took a break from its fascination 
with World War II to honor the Russians who died in the 19th-century Russian-Turkish wars.202 
Reverence of military campaigns from well before the Soviet period implies veneration of 
militarism and victory in the basic roots of Russian culture.   
Waves of posts celebrating Russian flag day, another prominent sign, at the end of 
August make Russia out to be a sacred entity steeped in heritage. Despite the protests and 
turmoil that society saw politically in the summer of 2019, Yunarmiya wished to put forth a 
united, strong image that people could look toward as an example.203 This means including even 
the less savory aspects of Russian history, so the Soviet era is glorified in many aspects. Most of 
these include tributes to both the military and civilians who lost their lives in World War II. 
However, Yunarmiya has gone as far as to bring members to Joseph Stalin’s summer home in 
Sochi to see the exhibits and how the dictator lived. The movement’s Instagram makes sure to 
mention how interested the members were in his personality.204 Incorporation of all aspects of 
Russia’s history is a bold approach to unity, as previous groups such as Moving Together vilified 
communist traditions to the point of hardcore opposition and protests.205 
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 Yunarmiya attempts to bring all areas of the nation together despite differences between 
regions or troubled histories. “Army-2019” participation reached across Russian borders to 
include Armenian, Belarussian, Greek, Iranian, and Kazakh participants for an event called 
“Warrior of Peace.”206 There is emphasis on the Caucasus republics in a handful of posts on 
VKontakte and Instagram, where Yunarmiya members participated in a “military-patriotic 
action” called the “Candle of Memory” to honor the 27 million Soviet citizens killed during 
WWII.207 This frequent incorporation of the Caucasus regions may be due to the troubles of past 
decades where war and terrorism have torn communities apart. Regions far from the center of the 
country have been mentioned expressing support from their own cohorts, including the Urals 
Yunarmiya groups, who pledged their “solidarity in the fight against terrorism.”208 
  Tying back to the “Candle of Memory,” much of the movement’s reverence for veterans 
is focused on the heroism and sacrifice of World War II. The summer of 2019 allowed for 
various events dedicated to the 74th anniversary of victory in WWII, a tradition that will continue 
this year as Yunarmiya gears up for the 75th anniversary with part of its website dedicated to the 
victory and veterans who helped achieve it.209 One of the most notable of these is the program 
“Handful of Memory,” in which earth from the graves of World War II veterans was collected by 
members in satchels referred to as “soldiers’ pouches” and placed in artillery shells to be added 
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to the “Patriot” park’s “Main Temple” of the 
military.210 The pouches are significant because 
by gathering this soil, made sacred for 
Yunarmiya’s secular ideology by the blood from 
fallen heroes, recruits are creating a new sort of 
holy space for themselves in Patriot park. They 
have also celebrated Victory over Japan day, 
which they have stated is to remember the past 
and pay respects to the veterans.211 Finally, 
Yunarmiya encourages observance at the Russian 
grave of the Unknown Soldier, a tradition also 
found in the United States and throughout Europe.212  
 Glorification of the Armed Forces and those who served prior to the members of 
Yunarmiya leads to the obvious conclusion that these children and teens are frequently exposed 
to recruitment for the Russian military. Perhaps one of the most telling phrases in the three 
months of social media posts studied here, Yunarmiya’s VKontakte page expresses the 
motivations for exposing children to the culture of the military, writing: “Service in the army 
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Figure 5: Cadet with one of the "soldier's pouches.” 
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teaches responsibility, discipline, fosters character, gives the opportunity to acquire a specialty. 
For children, military service will be a ticket to independent life.”213  
From the youngest to the oldest of Yunarmiya’s members, recruits are faced with 
programs that do not let them forget the role Yunarmiya and the Russian government are 
creating for them. Instagram features a drawing contest called “I am a child. I have my own 
rights and responsibilities.”214 From time to time, Yunarmiya members attend the swearing-in 
ceremonies of young people who are joining the real Russian Armed Forces, which often 
coincides with events called “Military service under contract in the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation is Your Choice!”215 In another instance, a similar event called “To serve under 
contract is the right choice,” which was featured on Yunarmiya’s VKontakte page, notes that by 
observance the children learned about the “opportunities to repay their debt to the 
Motherland.”216 
 To further guilt young people into the glory of military service, or make the image more 
enticing, Yunarmiya often stages publicity stunts, such as bringing professional athletes to coach 
members in sporting events.217 “Army-2019” included participation from the previously 
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mentioned show on “polite people” and “master classes” from military specialists.218 Yunarmiya 
appears to have been doing everything it can to encourage young people to become involved 
with their activities in order to gain favor and trust with an age group that has been somewhat 
difficult to reach in the past few decades. In Yunarmiya’s words, activities in the “Camp of Real 
Heroes” supposedly enjoyed the participation of youths who were not “indifferent” to the 
Russian nation and were prepared to dedicate themselves to “serving the Fatherland.”219 Decades 
of supposedly misled Russians makes the burden of debt to the nation even heavier on the 
shoulders of current members. By this line of logic, to redeem the generations that strayed from 
their community, young Russians cannot be indifferent to the state in any form. This attitude is 
the preferred outcome of Yunarmiya participation, but there are some who are not afraid to voice 
dissent against its policies. 
Response to Current Events 
 Finally, there is the matter of Yunarmiya’s role in addressing criticism and participating 
in current events. Previously outlined intentions incorporate the importance of a healthy lifestyle, 
respectful relationships with one’s community, and environmental friendliness. In respect to 
lifestyle choices, Yunarmiya pushes for more than military participation, discussing antismoking 
events, charity for disadvantaged children, and community service.220 Flooding affected families 
in Irkutsk in 2019, and Yunarmiya members often lent a helping hand by clearing garbage from 
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the area and organizing donations for children in 
need there.221  Environmental concerns also 
appear to have inspired the restoration and 
clearing of debris and dead trees in a memorial 
park dedicated to the “Hero of Socialist Labor” 
Pyotr Antipov.222 
Yunarmiya tries to appeal to progressive-
leaning members of its online audience by 
championing the participation and success of its 
female members. In the beginning of June, its 
VKontakte page featured a post about the 
program “The School of Real Men” allowing 
girls to participate in its activities.223 The movement’s Instagram highlights female participation 
especially when publicizing the “Victory-2019” games, discussing the prowess of a young team 
leader.224 This approach extended to the “Army-2019” games in August, when Instagram 
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Figure 6: Cadets compete in the Miss Yunarmiya 
pageant. 
Source: ЮНАРМИЯ | Официальная страница 





highlighted the women’s team representing Russia in the “Army-2019” games.225 There has been 
official supervision of the appearance of young female members, as a national Miss Yunarmiya  
pageant was organized, and Shoigu was noted at a separate occasion to have considered new 
uniforms especially well-designed.226 On its website and social media accounts, Yunarmiya does 
not appear to pressure young women to enlist in military service after finishing school, but 
there is no evidence that they are excluded from military activities or training. The movement’s 
dominant narrative is the desire to leave each member with skills useful to their community and 
future employment. 
Despite a relatively moderate approach to public relations and social commentary when 
compared to previous groups, Yunarmiya faced protest in 2019 distinct from political activism 
 
225"ЮНАРМИЯ." Instagram post. Last modified August 1, 2019. https://www.instagram.com/p/B0n6d96pMhM/. 
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Figure 7: Yunarmiya’s coverage of Shaidurov’s protest featuring Romanenko’s response (left) versus the 
photo of Shaidurov (right) that Romanenko showed in his Facebook appeal to Shaidurov.  
Sources: ЮНАРМИЯ | Официальная страница Движения. VKontakte post. Last modified June 24, 2019. 
https://vk.com/un.armia?w=wall-128940375_21882.  




coming over the horizon. Between June 24 and 26, both the VKontakte and Instagram accounts 
provided links for official responses to criticism about the movement existing for the sole 
purpose of militarizing the nation’s children. Leonid Shaidurov, the sixteen-year-old founder of a 
school trade union called “Student” (“Ученик”), conducted a six-day hunger strike against 
allowing Yunarmiya in schools.227 Commenting that students “are not pawns,” Shaidurov said 
that the movement subjected students to a political agenda and that he would not eat until St. 
Petersburg’s Committee on Education responded to his demands.228 Andrey Kartapolov, the 
Russian Deputy Minister of Defense, commented that rather than militarization, the movement is 
an initiative for those who want to accomplish things in life, as opposed to those who “want a 
little less.”229 Yunarmiya appears to have taken a less harsh approach in response to Shaidurov. 
Unfortunately, most of Yunarmiya’s responses to the protest have been removed with the 
revision of its website, but Romanenko’s personal response remains available on Facebook.230 In 
it, Romanenko appeals to Shaidurov through concerns for his health and offers to speak directly 
with the provocative student, hoping that he would change his mind about Yunarmiya once he 
saw “who was joining the movement and why.”231 In his post, Romanenko distances Yunarmiya 
from responsibility for Shaidurov’s actions, but the response itself is a major shift from former 
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Russian groups that would openly harass dissenters. Yunarmiya’s response technique also 
invalidates Shaidurov’s protest by framing it as an unnecessarily extreme measure that could 
have been avoided by talking with the movement’s leadership sooner. VKontakte and Instagram 
do not show Shaidurov’s photo or even mention his name, but shifts attention to Romanenko.  
The photo of Romanenko above is typical of many Yunarmiya posts. He is a symbol in 
the Russian semiosphere, clearly displaying his “Hero of the Russian Federation” medal and 
facing the audience as a bulwark of Russian unity and patriotism. His pose is reminiscent of 
official Soviet portraits and calls to mind the strength of Russian leadership that he wishes to 
emulate for Yunarmiya’s sake. By featuring Romanenko’s image in this situation, the movement 
adeptly structured the relationship between protester and authority in a manner which 
undermined the former’s potency for Yunarmiya’s audience. The appeal to Shaidurov to seek 
what Yunarmiya considers the reasonable side of this debate utilizes a method identified in 
Burke’s assessment of religious rhetoric.232 The protester would, in this case, be called to resist 
the temptation of disobeying authority and instead return to the side of “order” (as Burke 
understood it) by scapegoating himself and subjecting himself to the mortification of abiding by 
Yunarmiya’s ideology. 
Shaidurov’s hunger strike provides an example of how Yunarmiya’s subtle propaganda is 
more influential than it may appear at first glance. Lack of negative responses to criticism paired 
with successful events (according to its own publications) throughout the summer of 2019 
created a largely positive impression on the movement’s website and social media pages. While 
rhetorical and symbolic influences are present in Yunarmiya’s posts, they are skillfully 
 
232Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion, 189. 
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interwoven with promises of a successful future and uplifting images of happy, productive, 
patriotic youth. The group’s social media presence breathes life into fading memories and well-
worn lines of political and religious logic discussed in previous chapters.  
Analysis of Yunarmiya’s social media accounts provides an understanding of the way 
Russian young people understand political discourse and the increasing amount of qualifications 
the Russian government demands from them for status as a patriot. Between its website 
documents and social media presence, the movement has sought to assist Moscow by creating an 
ideal image of Russian youth once more. Because the Russian government is closely involved 
with selecting the characteristics the audience sees across these platforms, Yunarmiya speaks to 







CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER STUDY 
 In this study, I posed the questions of how Yunarmiya fosters both militaristic and 
nationalistic values and creates a specific, persuasive version of Russian nationalism. By drawing 
from literature on the historical situation of the Russian Federation and frameworks for effective 
propaganda and rhetoric, I have been able to analyze the motivations behind Yunarmiya’s 
website documents and social media presence. Inferring from the emphasis the movement places 
on certain subjects, the driving factors behind its creation and activities include a desire to build 
trust with Russia’s youngest generations, the need for increased specialization and ambition 
among young people entering into service of the state, and greater social unity and fixed support 
for the Russian government in times of political unrest. While promoting the development of 
widespread military involvement from children as young as eight years old is not a subtle 
strategy on Moscow’s part, it falls in line with the pattern of constructed political and social 
support from young people to which the Putin administration often resorts. 
 Regaining the trust of Russian youth after the social and economic discord of the 1990s 
has been a goal of the Russian government since Putin was first elected president twenty years 
ago, and remains crucial to his support as he seeks more time in power. Much of the language on 
Yunarmiya’s website and social media posts reveals a concern for respectful relations between 
children and teens and their communities. It highlights the importance of keeping up with young 
people and making sure they are heard by their leadership. If teens are frustrated with the 
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invalidation of their issues and goals, the generally positive environment that Yunarmiya 
advertises could offer an outlet they consider worthwhile.  
 Yunarmiya’s online audience can also see that its attention is concentrated on 
professional and military training. Leadership was quoted as stressing the importance of 
choosing a specialty in the group’s activities and developing one’s abilities in those fields in 
order to achieve an independent and supportive lifestyle. While many youth organizations exist 
across cultures to set children up for future success, the military focus that Yunarmiya pursues 
reveals a need from the Russian government for more enthusiastic participants in the armed 
forces and branches of public service who already possess some level of skill in the tasks they 
will be facing. Establishing an environment where children frequently observe military 
recruitment and veteran testimonies allows the movement to constantly show its recruits what it 
would like them to do in a way that provides them the opportunity to lean into these influences 
and set their sights on service. 
If we are to follow Yunarmiya’s propaganda to its logical conclusion with the help of 
Burke’s rhetorical analysis, however, we will see that simply gaining trust and promoting 
military service is not enough. Russian leadership needs to plant a seed of guilt in young 
peoples’ minds so that they feel that they owe their service to the state. Because Yunarmiya 
provides resources and knowledge to its members and lets them play at being in the army (or a 
variety of other career paths valuable to the government) while constantly reminding them of the 
sacrifices their countrymen have made for them to live the way they do, the movement creates a 
sense of duty to the nation. The images and language used on Yunarmiya’s website and social 
media accounts portray this process in a positive light. If these children choose careers that are 
consistent with those they practiced in the group, it would seem unpatriotic to discourage 
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someone from becoming a defender or protector of the community. Having been given 
opportunities by the state, young recruits are urged to return the favor with serious commitments 
and loyalty. 
 Moscow is always in need of support, and has had no qualms about creating groups 
specifically geared toward endorsing government policy in the past. Yunarmiya’s founding soon 
after the annexation of Crimea and before Putin’s reelection as president in 2018 gave the 
movement an appropriate context in which to flourish and create a brave, patriotic face of 
national unity among a still-growing number of Russian children. This influence is carried along 
to the family and acquaintances of each member, and has been cementing support of varying 
degrees for the Russian state and president for approximately five years. The combination of 
these characteristics implies the need for a skilled and supportive populace for decades to come, 
which will be created by molding young Russians into the state’s ideal image.  
 The only other post-Soviet youth movement similar in scope and longevity to Yunarmiya 
has been Nashi. With estimates between 100,000 and 200,000 members, the group organized a 
plethora of events from community outreach to political rallies.233 It was criticized as a method 
of limiting political dissent in a time of political revolution in surrounding countries and trained 
some of its top participants for leadership roles in the government through tactics similar to 
Yunarmiya’s (master classes and camps).234 Nashi’s ideology allowed Putin to take on oligarchs 
that remained prominent in business from the 1990s as well as introduce the idea of a unique 
 
233Armine Ishkanian. "Nashi: Russia’s youth counter-movement." openDemocracy. Last modified August 30, 2007. 
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Russian style of democracy that diverges from the West.235 Although the movement enjoyed 
relative success, publicity scandals contributed to its fall in 2012, as emails were leaked which 
revealed payment to bloggers and journalists to promote Nashi and Putin on the internet and in 
tabloids while undermining opposition movements.236 One of its major spokespeople, Kristina 
Potupchik, left Nashi in June of 2012, and its founder Vasily Yakemanko was quoted in early 
2013 saying that a new movement would carry on its legacy with different objectives and a new 
name.237 Yunarmiya may be the new incarnation if Yakemenko stayed in favor with the Putin 
administration. 
 Like previous movements, Yunarmiya may be left by the wayside if it does not 
successfully meet the objectives for which it was created. This explains the caution it has 
exercised when dealing with external criticism and may provide insight into the removal of 
documents such as the original hymn, oath, and goals from its website. However, if its 
membership numbers and spread of offices are anywhere near the truth of the matter, I believe 
that five years of programs and influence will be more difficult to dismantle. The nature of 
Yunarmiya’s focus on military participation and veteran memorialization makes its ideology 
better able to endure the test of time, as these issues will remain relevant. 
 My research has evaluated a mere fraction of the content that Yunarmiya displays online. 
Further study should be conducted to pursue questions about the manner in which the movement 
interacts with the media and cultural institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as 
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the potential for international cooperation with other youth movements.  As the Russian 
government undergoes changes to its constitution and governmental structure this year, enjoying 
the devoted support that Yunarmiya advertises is a luxury. These children and teens are growing 
up in a time when Putin’s increasing control over Russian government and civil society will be 
resisted by many, but the former’s affiliations and the influences they are exposed to will likely 
shape their political opinions and the nature of their participation for decades to come. As the 
75th anniversary of the end of World War II approaches, Yunarmiya has been organizing 
programs to memorialize veterans and celebrate their victory. There is potential for future 
research into the necessities of military recruitment for Moscow and how this could affect 
Russian foreign and domestic policy going forward.  
 Yunarmiya has resisted criticism and a negative environment that some of its 
predecessors could not navigate with such ease, and the patriotism and solidarity that it 
represents for Russian citizens can be viewed as encouraging or worrying depending on one’s 
assessment of the Russian government’s intentions. This study has established that whether or 
not it is meant to do so maliciously, Yunarmiya’s online presence is a way of propagandizing the 
development of ideal citizens for service to the Russian state and administration. The authenticity 
that a variety of heroes of the Soviet Union and Russian Federation lend to the movement is a 
manner of persuading young people and their families that there is a bright future ahead for their 
nation that can be achieved by following in the former’s footsteps. Yunarmiya’s activities and 
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